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On 26 June 1997, the US Supreme 
Court issued its long-awaited decision in
O
Reno v American Civil Liberties Union 117 S 
Ct 2329 (1997). While it has been hailed 
widely as an enormous victory for free 
speech on the Internet, the decision to 
overturn key portions of the 
Communications Decency Act ('CDA') was 
hardly a surprise. Given the poor drafting 
of the statute, and the extensive and 
completely pro-plaintiff findings of fact 
by the trial court   which in the US 
system are almost never open to direct 
revision by the courts of appeal   the 
Supreme Court had little choice.
Although the decision is a victory for 
free speech online, the decision is as 
notable for what it does not say as for 
what it decides. Indeed, the decision 
demonstrates great caution on the part of 
the US Supreme Court with regards to 
new communications technologies ando
new media.
WHAT IS/WAS THE CDA?
To understand what was decided in the 
Reno case   and, more importantly, what 
was not decided   requires a brief 
description of the CDA and of the 
litigation mounted by a coalition of 
advocacy groups that ultimately defeated 
it.
The CDA was added at the last minute 
to the omnibus Telecommunications Act 
1996, a bill designed to foster the rapid 
deployment of new telecommunications 
technologies by promoting competition 
in telephones, multichannel video and 
broadcasting. Section 233(a), the so- 
called 'indecent transmission' provision, 
made it an offense to send an 'obscene or 
indecent' communication to a person 
known by the sender to be under 18 
years of age, while s. 233(d), the 'patently 
offensive' provision, criminalized the use 
of an 'interactive computer service' to 
display any type of communication that:
'depicts or describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs'
in a manner which might be available to a 
person under 18 years of age.
The constitutional problems created 
by these two provisions were legion. It is 
long-settled law that obscene speech is 
not protected by the First Amendment. 
Not all pornography is legally obscene, 
however, and non-obscene sexual speech 
falls into a vague category of 'indecency' 
which enjoys substantial if occasionally 
ambiguous constitutional protection. 
See, e.g. Sable Communications of Cal Inc v 
FCC 492 US 115, at p.126 (1989) 
(invalidating restrictions on 'dial-a-porn' 
services). It is also settled that the 
government can impose restrictions on 
broadcasts or public displays of 
'indecent' but not obscene material to 
minors, e.g. Ginsberg v New York 390 US 
629 (1968), so long as adult access is not 
substantially impaired. A regulation may 
not, however, reduce the programming 
available to the adult population to what 
is suitable for children: Denver Area 
Telecommunications Consortium Inc v FCC 
518 US; 116 SCt 2374, at p.2837-2838 
(1996), and Butler v Michigan 352 US 
380, atp.383 (1957).
But neither principle justifies a rule 
which criminalizes the sending of merely 
indecent (but not obscene) messages to a 
minor even if the parent consented; 
indeed even it the parent was sending the 
message. Nor could these principles 
stretch to fit a rule making it a crime to 
display 'patently offensive' non-obscene 
material in a manner that might be 
viewed by a minor. Indeed, it is a bedrock 
principle of First Amendment law that a 
statute which even 'chills'   much less 
criminalizes   adult non-obscene speech 
can only be justified if the statute is clear, 
specific, and narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling state interest. Given that 
many types of Internet communication 
such as Usenet, mailing lists and web 
pages are communications that are made 
available to millions of potential readers, 
few if any of whom are known to or 
knowable by the author, the CDA 
potentially would have reached almost 
any Internet-based communication other 
than email to specific, known recipients.
THE LITIGATION
Not surprisingly, a coalition of civil
liberties groups filed suit to strike down 
the CDA as soon as the President had 
signed the bill into law. The CDA 
provided for expedited trial procedures, 
with the trial court and sole fact-finding 
tribunal composed of two federal district 
court judges and one judge from the 
Court of Appeal rather than the usual 
single-judge district court that ordinarily 
hears constitutional challenges. Appeals 
from the three-judge court went directly 
to the Supreme Court, bypassing the 
usual intermediate stop in the Court of 
Appeal.
The plaintiffs were a diverse group of 
free speech activists, providers of AIDS- 
related information, writers, news 
organizations, providers of online 
services including America Online and 
CompuServe and Microsoft, and 
establishment organizations such as 
Apple Computer, the American Library 
Association and Planned Parenthood. 
They were carefully selected to make the 
point that the law threatened to 
criminalize the ordinary activities of 
many people who were the furthest thing 
from pornographers. The plaintiffs chose 
to file in Philadelphia because ot a 
favorable local precedent. Their detailed 
and elegant complaint demonstrated how 
in some cases the CDA would chill their 
speech by making them self-censor 
socially valuable communications such as 
sex and health education; and in other 
cases how the CDA imposed such 
onerous requirements that it would shut 
down entire communications fora.
BACKGROUND TO THE 
CASE
The case aroused considerable interest 
for two reasons. First, it was clear that 
the case would ultimately be decided by 
the Supreme Court, and thus would 
become the first case in which the court 
directly addressed the application of the 
First Amendment to the Internet. 
Second, the facts of the matter tell across 
fault lines in three related, and unsettled, 
lines of cases.
In Denver Area Ed Telecommunications 
Consortium Inc v FCC 5 18 US; 116 S Ct 
2374 (1996), a highly fractured Supreme 27
Court was unable to agree as to how to 
apply first amendment jurisprudence to a 
similar new medium   cable television. 
Several members of the court cast doubt 
on the applicability of portions of earlier 
cases such as Sable Communications of Cal 
Incv FCC492 US 115, at p. 126 (1989), 
and Turner Broadcasting v FCC 512 US 622 
(1994), which had set out principles for 
applying the First Amendment to non- 
broadcast media.
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion for 
four of the nine justices was almost 
intentionally opaque, stating
'aware as we are of the changes taking place 
in the law, the technology, and the industrial 
structure, related to telecommunications ...we 
believe it unwise to and unnecessarily definitive 
to pick one analogy or one specific set of words 
now'.
In their separate opinions, Justice 
Kennedy and Justice Souter both 
responded by pointing out that there was 
no reason to suggest, as Breyer seemed to 
do, that uncertainty might justify 
increased regulation. On the contrary, 
they said, given the high standards any 
restriction on speech must meet, doubt 
should lead to fewer limits on speech, not 
more.
In leading cases addressing the effect of 
the First Amendment on broadcasting 
regulation, e.g. FCC v Pacifica Foundation 
438 US 726 (1978), the Supreme Court 
has held that because broadcast television 
and radio are such pervasive media and 
are particularly accessible to children, the 
Federal Government can require 
broadcasters to restrict 'indecent' non- 
obscene speech to evening time periods 
when children would be less likely to be 
watching. The Internet is, if anything, a
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potentially more pervasive medium than 
television, raising the question of whether 
the logic of Pacifica might apply with 
greater force to justify the CDA.
On the other hand, neither Congress 
nor the Supreme Court had explained 
how indecent speech should be defined. 
The obscenity cases suggested that local 
community standards should define 
whether pornography was obscene, but a 
similar procedure seemed difficult to 
imagine in the context of Internet 
indecency because the Internet is a 
national, even international, 
communications channel. The relevant 
locality might thus be the entire country, 
a decision which in turn would threaten 
to cast some doubt on the obscenity 
precedents. Conversely, if one followed
the obscenity model and allowed every 
community to be its own arbiter, the 
national nature of the medium would 
mean that the most prudish community 
in Utah would in effect set the entire 
nation's standards   or acquire the means 
to prosecute every utterance of a four- 
letter word on the national network.
Furthermore, in Denver Area, Justice 
Kennedy suggested that the reach of 
Pacifica and its ilk should be limited to 
broadcast media because the government 
must regulate the spectrum, a scare 
resource. Other media, he suggested, 
should not be subject to similar rules. In 
contrast, the plurality opinion of Justice 
Breyer appeared to rely more on the 
medium's pervasiveness rather than the 
reason for regulating a medium.
In the unfortunate decision of Renton v 
Playtime Theaters Inc 475 US 41 (1986), 
the Supreme Court held that even when 
the government could not justify content 
regulations prohibiting salacious speech 
in seedy movie theaters directly, it might 
still prohibit them by passing an 
ordinance ostensibly aimed at the 
'secondary effects' of blue movie theaters 
on local property values and crime. 
Critics of Renton were quick to note that 
the same logic could be used to sneak in 
an otherwise unconstitutional content 
restriction on any speech which could 
plausibly be said to have an undesirable 
side-effect. Indeed, the CDA's defenders 
would argue before the Supreme Court 
that fear of having their children exposed 
to pornography discouraged them from 
availing themselves of the benefits of 
Internet access. The CDA case seemed to 
offer a chance for the court to either limit 
Renton or demonstrate that the critics 
were correct.
THE ORIGINAL DECISION
After extensive evidentiary hearings, 
the three judges of the trial court issued 
an unusual opinion. It began with a 
unanimous and quite impressive 
recitation of their factual findings. This 
part of the decision will no doubt serve as 
a primer for both judges and students 
seeking an introduction to the workings
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and significance of the Internet for some 
time to come. Ultimately, it may prove to 
be as influential as the Supreme Court's 
final judgment. The three judges also 
agreed unanimously that both the 
indecent transmission and the patently 
offensive provisions were 
unconstitutional. Each issued separate 
and somewhat conflicting opinions,
however, as to why this was the case. 
After some doubt as to whether it might 
let the ruling stand, the government 
exercised its right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court.
Given the one-sidedness of the facts, 
the erudite and in some cases far- 
reaching theories employed by the trial 
court judges, and the importance of the 
issue, the stage was set for a fundamental 
pronouncement about free speech in 
cyberspace. None emerged. The 
Supreme Court, with two justices 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
affirmed the trial court but avoided grand 
pronouncements on most of the 
fundamental issues underlying the case.
This caution was all the more 
surprising given that the author of the 
court's majority opinion, Justice Stevens, 
recently authored Mclntyre v Ohio Elections 
Commission 1 15 S Ct 151 1 (1995), which 
rhapsodizes about the importance of the 
First Amendment while upholding the 
right to unfettered anonymous leafleting 
in political campaigns. Stevens, however, 
had agreed in Denver Area that the 
dynamic nature of the cable TV industry 
made it unwise for the court to impose 
categorical First Amendment limitations 
on federal regulatory power.
Stevens's record on the First 
Amendment was in any case less clear-cut 
than his reputation as the court's last 
liberal might suggest. He not only wrote 
the opinion in Pacifica but he dissented in 
Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989), when 
the court used the First Amendment to 
strike down a statute criminalizing 
burning the US flag.
Justice Stevens's opinion in Reno 
distinguished Renton as relating to
o o
secondary effects, while the 'purpose of 
the CDA is to protect children from the 
primary effects'. (The two partly 
dissenting justices would have used 
Renton to allow the government to create 
smut-free zones on the Internet.) He 
distinguished his earlier judgement in 
Pacifica as relating to when rather than 
whether indecency could be broadcast. It 
avoided some of the definitional issues by 
treating indecency and 'patently 
offensive' as 'synonymous'. It 
distinguished most cases upholding the 
regulation of radio and television on the 
grounds that the regulations at issue in 
those cases were carefully designed to 
solve specific problems, arising from the 
evaluations of an agency (the FCC) 
familiar with the unique characteristics of
the medium, rather than hurried acts of 
Congress taken without clear evidence 
that the solution was tailored to the evil.
In a return to the normal practice 
before Denver Area appeared to make an 
exception for cable TV, the court did hold 
that traditional strict scrutiny analysis, 
the most searching type, was the 
appropriate level of examination of 
content restrictions affecting the 
Internet. Having said that, however, the 
court proceeded to invalidate both 
challenged portions of the CDA on the 
grounds that they were fatally vague, a 
ground of decision that does not
o
necessarily rely on using strict scrutiny, 
particularly since the CDA created a 
criminal offense.
Vagueness is unconstitutional in both 
criminal law and when it chills protected 
speech. Indeed, even a law that is not 
vague but chills speech in the service of a 
compelling objective can be 
unconstitutional for 'overbreadth' if it 
reaches protected speech and the court 
believes a less restrictive alternative could 
have achieved the same objectives.
In the case of the CDA, the court held 
that adult speech would be chilled 
impermissibly by having to ascertain that 
every potential recipient of a message was 
of age. Relying on the trial court's factual 
finding that filtering by recipients would 
be a less restrictive user-based technology 
that could achieve the government's 
asserted aims of protecting children from 
material that their parents wished to 
shield them from, the Supreme Court 
also held that the CDA was overbroad.
The court accepted the premise that 
the state has an interest in empowering 
parents to control what their children 
read and see. It seemed particularly 
concerned, however, about the statute's 
intrusion into parent/child relations, 
although the state's attempt to take on 
the role of moral educator seemed less 
offensive than the danger that the statute 
might criminalize parent-child 
communications.
Despite all this, only the conclusion 
hinted at any grand statement, and it too 
was hedged with qualifications:
'As a matter of constitutional tradition, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, we 
presume that governmental regulation of the 
content of speech is more likely to interfere 
with the free exchange of ideas than to 
encourage it. The interest in encouraging 
freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven 
benefits of censorship.'
THE BOTTOM LINE
The bottom line from all this is quite 
straightforward: restrictions on Internet 
speech, unlike those on broadcasting and 
perhaps unlike statutes regulating cable 
television, should benefit from an 
exacting First Amendment-based 
scrutiny near to or perhaps even equal to 
what is applied to the regulation of 
books, newspapers and films. Other than 
that, almost nothing has been decided 
about content restrictions aimed at 
Internet speech. In particular, the 
opinion says nothing about the 
constitutionality of a CDA that might, for 
example, require that web pages and 
perhaps other Internet communications 
carry a rating code giving the recipientJ o o o 1
advance warning of the sexual (or other) 
content of the communication.
A compelled rating statute, or one 
setting penalties for misrating, would fall 
somewhere between two stools. On the 
one hand, some compelled speech is 
currently forbidden. States, for example, 
are not allowed to forbid motorists from 
removing the state motto from a car 
license plate (Wooley v Maynard 430 US 
70S, at p.713 (f977)), nor may they 
require that students recite the pledge of 
allegiance (West Virginia State Board of 
Education v Barnette 319 US 624, at p.642 
(1943)). On the other hand, there are 
many cases holding that where there is a 
compelling state interest, no undue 
burdens and a narrowly tailored rule, the 
government may require individuals to 
disclose facts.
Shortly before deciding the Reno case, 
for example, the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment imposed no 
bar to the state of California's 
requirement that growers and handlers of 
tree fruits contribute to a fund used for 
generic advertising of nectarines, plums, 
and peaches: Glickman v Wileman Bros 117 
S Ct 2130 (1997). Earlier, in Riley v 
National Fed'n of the Blind 487 US 781, at 
p.795 (1988), the Supreme Court held 
that the state interest in telling donors
how charities use their contributions is 
sufficient to mandate disclosure.
Presumably the state interest in 
empowering parents to control what 
their children access online will be no 
less, and could suffice to require that at 
least commercial suppliers of 
information affix some accurate 
information describing the nature of the 
content. Whether this is correct, and it 
so whether the principle could be 
extended to non-commercial speech, or 
to the most protected category   political 
speech   are issues that the Reno 
decision does not address.
Lurking in the background, and now 
working their way up from the lower 
courts, are further unresolved issues 
about the application of the First 
Amendment, not to mention the rest of 
the US Constitution, to the Internet. 
Notable in this regard are:
o
The cryptography cases   Karn v US 
925 F Supp 1 (DDC 1996), vacated and 
remanded 107 F 3d 923 (DC Cir 1997), 
and Bernstein v US Dept of State 922 F Supp 
1426 (DND Cal 1996); 945 F Supp 
1279 (DND Cal 1996) - which test the 
government's ability to restrict the 
export of computer source code that can 
be used to encrypt messages in the light 
of the argument that source code is 
protected first amendment speech.
The commerce clause cases   e.g.o
American Library Assoc v Pataki 1997 WL 
342488 (SDNY20June 1997) zndACLU 
of Georgia v Miller, available on line at 
http://www.aclu.org/court/aclugavmiller. 
html, (N D Ga 20 June 1997) - in which 
the courts must decide whether a state's 
attempt to regulate various Internet 
activities encroach upon the exclusive 
power of the federal Congress to makes 
rules of national commercial effect.
A raft of jurisdiction cases in which 
courts struggle to determine what sort of 
online activities and what level of contact 
with a forum bring an out-of-state (oro x
offshore) party within the jurisdiction of 
the court, or within the taxing power of 
the legislature. ®
on the i i
http://www.w3.org/PICS and http://www.rsac.org/index.html
Examples of rating systems now being tested include PICS, the Platform for 
Internet Content Selection, see http://www.w3.org/PICS and the Recreational 
Advisory Software Council on the Internet, see http://www.rsac.org/index.html
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